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PETER BARTRIP*
I am delighted that my article elicited a reply from DrGreenberg and ProfessorWikeley
for debate is the stuffofhistory, and the history ofasbestos and health has been one-sided
for too long. My critics level four main charges. Regrettably, they provide little support
for these; instead they endeavour to make their case largely through unsupported
assertion. This rejoinder responds to their main points and demonstrates, by reference to
the evidence, why their criticisms lack substance. At the outset though, it is well to
acknowledge that there is common ground between us, namely, that it is clear, with the
benefit of hindsight, that the 1931 Regulations did not go far enough either in terms of
processes and personnel covered, or in the dust standards required of industry. My
fundamental point is that, in the light of the knowledge available to them, the regulators
of the 1920s and 1930s (assisted by the asbestos manufacturers and the TUC) acted
promptly and conscientiously to do everything practically possible to tackle recognized
dangers. That these actions were not fully adequate, or that they were insufficient to cover
the then unknown hazard ofmesothelioma, did not become apparent until the 1960s. With
the emergence of such knowledge, more stringent and extensive Regulations were
introduced.
First, in their attempt to refute my demonstration that the 1931 Regulations were not
established tardily, Greenberg and Wikeley assert that a "substantial body of work ...
drew attention to the potential dangers" of asbestos dust prior to the establishment of the
Merewether-Price inquiry. Except for a reference to Greenberg's own, error-strewn,
article, they provide no evidence to support the claim.' We can agree that from 1898 the
Factory Inspectorate knew that asbestos, in common with other industrial dusts, posed a
potential health threat; after all, the first suggestions that a possible hazard existed
appeared in the pages of its annual reports. However, the Inspectorate also knew that the
asbestos industry was tiny and that it was attempting to tackle its dust problem. On more
than one occasion the Chief Lady Inspector praised manufacturers' introduction of
preventive measures. By the same token Dr Montague Murray informed an official
committee in 1907 ofhis understanding that the industry was making successful efforts to
prevent dust inhalation. When Factory Inspectors investigated the industry in 1917 they
reached a similar conclusion. That a few overseas publications were suggesting a possible
health hazard was of little significance if the British asbestos industry was being run in
such a way that workers were not falling ill. In fact, in Britain, prior to the mid-1920s,
when a few cases came to light, there was scant evidence either of a sick workforce or of
irresponsible behaviour by employers. This surely explains why Thomas Oliver, Edgar
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Collis and other occupational health specialists ignored the asbestos industry in their
numerous published works.
Second, Greenberg and Wikeley question my view that they imply that the process
leading to the 1931 Regulations was one-sided and consisted of "cosy" negotiations
between civil servants and the asbestos industry in which organized labour played only a
minor role. They protest that I have caricatured Wikeley's argument. But Wikeley has
described the Regulations as a "package of measures" agreed by "state and industry". In
addition, he maintains that "the TUC was effectively presented with afaitaccomplr'. It is
difficult to determine the intent ofsuch observations ifit is not to imply that the regulatory
process was one-sided. I am also taken to task for overlooking the concept of"scheduled
areas" to which the regulations were restricted. In fact my article explicitly acknowledges
that the 1931 Regulations did not apply throughout asbestos factories, albeit that they did
cover the dustiest locations. What needs to be stressed, however, is that the Merewether-
Price Report, which provided the basis forthe Regulations, identified the dangers ofheavy
and prolonged dust exposure. Decades later it became apparent that comparatively light
and brief exposures could also be hazardous, but in the 1930s there were no suggestions
that this was the case. Consequently, it was then entirely reasonable for the regulators to
adopt the approach that they did.
Third, Greenberg and Wikeley argue that Turner & Newall was "concerned throughout
to limit the scope of regulatory control". Since they adduce no evidence relating to the
period covered by my paper in support oftheirclaim, it is difficult to know how to respond
beyond referring to the contrary testimony of various witnesses, including Sir Thomas
Legge, referred to in my article. Mischievously, Greenberg and Wikeley dismiss Legge's
praise of T&N as the "endorsement" of "a sick man". Legge, who died in 1932, probably
was unwell in 1931 but is there any indication that he was mentally incapable? After the
enactment of the Regulations there is much further evidence, some cited in my article, of
the company's compliance with statutory requirements. If T&N was such an appalling
company why were civil servants and independent scientists continuing to praise its high
standards ofhygiene, as they were, more than thirty years after the 1931 Regulations were
enacted?2 As for the alleged warnings that Legge received about cancer; these came from
a semi-literate, medically and scientifically unqualified, opportunist called Reginald Tage.
Examination of Trades Union Congress files held at the University ofWarwick's Modern
Records Centre reveals his "warnings" actually to have been no more than very brief
suggestions ofthe need for investigation. The broader question ofT&N's attitude towards
research on asbestos and health cannot be properly discussed in the space available here.
Suffice to say that several important investigations were carried out with that company's
assistance and sometimes at its instigation. These included various projects carried out by
Richard Doll, among them the celebrated 1955 study that resulted in the identification of
asbestos employment as a risk factor in the onset oflung cancer, and the researches ofIan
Grieve, Matthew Stewart, Georgiana Bonser, J C Wagner, Archibald Cochrane and Dermot
Hourihane. Further, it has given me support and unrestricted access to its archive in
connection with my historical work. Certainly, to characterize T&N as a company opposed
to occupational health research, as Greenberg and Wikeley do, is a travesty ofthe truth.
2 See, e.g., PRO LAB 14/1590. Asbestos Industry Meeting held on 4 Nov. 1965.
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Fourth, Greenberg and Wikeley take me to task for using the official statistics to point
out the declining death rate among asbestos factory workers in the first twenty-five years
of regulation. They claim that the figures under-recorded the true rate of mortality. With
the benefit ofhindsight that is probably a reasonable conjecture, but is there any evidence
that contemporaries either were aware or should have been aware that such was the case?
For his part Merewether was confident that "very few deaths from asbestosis escape
notice".3 Others, such as Doll and Bonser, were convinced that the Regulations were
having a favourable impact, while Donald Hunter, one of the leading authorities in the
field ofoccupational health, pronounced in the 1950s that the British "legislation has been
effective in controlling the disease" ofasbestosis.4 Oddly, given the relatively long run of
statistics to which I refer (twenty-seven years), my critics accuse me of ignoring the
latency factor in asbestos disease. Still more oddly they support their point by referring to
mesothelioma, a cancer that was not proved to be linked to asbestos exposure until the
1960s. Finally, Greenberg and Wikeley question my observation that the asbestos industry
is "virtually extinct"; yet UK imports of asbestos dropped precipitately from 190,000
tonnes in 1973 to 1,840 tonnes in 1998-a decline of over 99 per cent. Furthermore the
Health and Safety Commission has recently proposed a prohibition on all imports "except
in certain well defined and limited cases".5 Can it really be argued that these are not the
signs of an industry in terminal decline?
In conclusion, Greenberg and Wikeley's reply to my article fails to weaken my fully-
documented demonstration, thatthe Asbestos Industry Regulations, 1931 were established
promptly following medical recognition of a definite potential health hazard associated
with heavy and prolonged exposure to asbestos dust; that those regulations were the
product of a collaborative endeavour on the part of civil servants, industry and organised
labour; and that until the 1960s they were widely recognized as effective in controlling
both asbestosis and lung cancer among workers in asbestos factories.
3 E R A Merewether, 'The pneumoconioses- 5 HSC consultative document: proposalsfor
bricks in search of an architect', Archiva za Higijenu amendments to the Asbestos (Prohibitions)
Rada, 1953, 4: 380. Regulations 1992, Suffolk, HSE Books, 1998,
4 The diseases ofoccupations, London, English pp. 1-2.
Universities Press, 1955, p. 881.
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